Here is what I have in mind - happy to take comments and
thanks for all those on yesterday’s post.
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Submission to the Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing.
Topic: Exposure Draft PCEHR Bill
Date October, 2011
Submissions Due: 28 October, 2011
Address for submissions:
E-mail
Postal Mail
PCEHR Legislation Issues Feedback
Department of Health and Ageing
GPO Box 9848
Canberra, ACT 2606
Department of Health and Ageing
GPO Box 9848
Canberra, ACT 2606
Submission Author:
Dr David G More BSc, MB, BS, PhD, FANZCA, FCICM, FACHI.
Author’s Background. I am experienced specialist clinician
who has been working in the field of e-Health for over 20 years. I have
undertaken major consulting and advisory work for many private and public
sector organisations including both DoHA and NEHTA.
Previous Submissions
I previously provided a Submission on the PCEHR proposal to
NHHRC in May, 2009 and the views expressed in that submission remain my
position despite the work undertaken by DoHA and NEHTA since.
This submission is available here:
A later submission on the Draft Concept of Operations for
the PCEHR from May2011 is found here:
Consent for Publication.
I am more than happy for this submission to be made
available for public review on the Department of Health and Ageing website.
Submission
As a non-lawyer I am unable to comment on the drafting of
the planned Bills but am basing my comments on the Companion to the Exposure
Draft Bill - as I am sure this document accurately reflects both the intention
and the drafting of the proposed Bill(s).
It is my view that the intent reflected in the Companion
document is deeply flawed and will result in failure of the PCEHR System to
deliver the outcomes sought by the Government.
In my view there are two major errors of omission and two
major errors of commission contained in the present proposals.
Error of Omission Number
1. - The Lack of an Agreed, Consulted and Legislated Framework for the
Governance of the PCEHR.
On Page 13 of the
Companion: (as reported by Adobe Reader)
"It is
intended that the Secretary will fill the role of System Operator initially.
Further discussions will be held with the states and territories around
possible future options for the long-term governance of national e-health such
as an inter-jurisdictional body."
This is a disastrous flaw and will guarantee there is simply
no one will trust the system. Having a system holding your private health
information which is not at arm’s length to Government and to political interference
is vital.
I believe the best way this can be achieved is via an
independent Statutory Authority which is responsible to parliament for its
activities, reports regularly, is subject to review by Parliament and Senate
Estimates, has a formal recurring budget allocation and a properly constituted
and accountable board.
Unless this is planned, discussed, legislated and delivered
the Government is simply setting itself up for a lack of public confidence and
failure.
Error of Omission
Number 2. The Failure to Provide a Legislated and Obligatory Breach Reporting
Regime.
On page 29 of the Companion to the Exposure Draft we read:
“Certain
participants in the PCEHR system must notify certain matters such as data
breaches or risk of being in contravention of the Draft Bill with potential
civil penalties to apply to those contraventions.
Entities
such as the System Operator, a registered repository or registered portal
provider have obligations to report matters to the System Operator, or in
certain circumstances both the System Operator and the Information
Commissioner.
In
addition to the notification, the entity must do the followings things:
- contain the contravention and undertake a preliminary analysis;
- evaluate the associated risks;
- if the entity is the System Operator – consider notifying the affected consumers;
- if the entity is not the System Operator – ask the System Operator to consider notifying the affected consumers.
In
addition, the entity must take steps to prevent or mitigate the effects of
further contraventions, events or circumstances in relation to the unauthorised
collection, use or disclosure of health information included in a person’s
PCEHR.
A further
civil penalty provision in the Draft Bill provides that a registered repository
operator or a registered portal operator must not contravene the PCEHR Rules
that apply to that operator or portal.”
Can I
suggest this is just not good enough. The legislation should make it clear that
the release or breach of any personally identifiable information should be
notified to the individual concerned and additionally any breach that involves
more than 100 individuals should be notified to the public with an analysis of
what caused the breach.
Of course
notification is just bolting the door after the horse has gone and clearly the
legislation should also make it clear, as it does to some extent, that to
prevent breaches in the first place is required and to not take reasonable
preventative steps is also an offence.
Proof of
the benefit of this approach is that in the US there is compulsion to notify
significant breaches and, of course, this is the reason we know how it bad it
is over there and why we need the same approach here.
Error of Commission
Number 1. A blatant attempt to transfer responsibility for identification of
users of the PCEHR from the Government provided security systems to the
practitioner or other entity who is accessing the PCEHR.
Page 33 of the
Companion: (As reported by Adobe Reader)
“Registered
healthcare provider organisations must ensure that individuals accessing PCEHRs
on their behalf (i.e. authorised users) provide, at the time of access,
sufficient information to identify the individual accessing the PCEHR. This
requirement is essential to ensuring a comprehensive audit trail is maintained
of access to consumers’ PCEHRs.”
What does this
actually mean and how will it work? It seems to it mean the provider
organisation needs to retain an audit trail of which user who logged on to what
system using the organisational certificate. Note this appears to transfer an
obligation to do so from the PCEHR Operator and the PCEHR system back to the
healthcare provider organisation.
It is also clear that
the approach to providing a user specific audit trail from provider to the
PCEHR system is still pretty much a work in progress (in the absence of NASH
actually being defined and implemented) - and that the assurances given by
NEHTA and the Minister that full audit trails of user access will not be
available when the System commences - and for a good while thereafter if
special legislative cover is required.
No provided is going to expose themselves to the substantial
penalties proposed for no benefit. This approach will ensure just zero
practitioner participation once they are advised of the risks by their
indemnity insurers.
Error of Commission
Number 2. Removal of Both The Commonwealth and All Jurisdiction from Any
Accountability and Liability for Harm and Damage Caused by The PCEHR System.
Page 8 of the Companion: (As reported by Adobe Reader)
“Binding of the Crown
The Draft Bill
applies to the Commonwealth, states and territories and section 7 of the Draft
Bill provides that all jurisdictions will be subject to this law.
While each
jurisdiction will be legally bound by the arrangements set out in the Draft
Bill, the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, states and territories will not
be subject to prosecution and will not be liable for pecuniary penalties.”
So it seems no
Government can be sued or prosecuted for any harm or damage resulting from this
Legislation and its implementation.
This section
clearly does not correctly balance the interests of citizens and government.
There are a number
of other minor points where I feel the planned Legislation is in error but
correcting the issues cited above would clearly take enormous strides towards
some satisfactory and implementable outcomes.
David G More
Date 11.10.2011.
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Comments and
Suggestions Please!
David.
>> "No provided is going to expose themselves to the substantial penalties proposed for no benefit. This approach will ensure just zero practitioner participation once they are advised of the risks by their indemnity insurers."
ReplyDeleteSecond word should be provider... It's a joke that they don't have the audit trail switched on at launch.
This is getting beyond a joke. If they want a PCEHR with an audit trail then they provide the PKI infrastructure that enables it. If patient privacy is to be taken seriously then of course government agencies need to be liable for breeches.
ReplyDeleteMaybe they are finally accepting that they can't get anything right so are trying to silently create an environment where it all becomes unworkable. If the Tax department treats you unfairly then you have some vain hope of action against them. It seems with the PCEHR this is not the case!! Most privacy breeches are within the walls, and we have ample evidence of that from Medicare. In the case of the PCEHR you can take no action!!!
"In the case of the PCEHR you can take no action" - yes you can. Don't have one!!!! That's the safest, most secure option.
ReplyDelete