This, really useful, summary article
appeared last week:
06 March 2024
By
Jeremy
Knibbs
Investing in
the sector feels like a mug’s game post-ZIRP and covid but some groups are
defying negative sentiment.
A
few ground rules to keep in mind should you decide to have a go at reading
this.
I
did a version of this a few years back – Our
11 most valuable digital health companies – which taught me a bit, largely
through all the things I got wrong (which was quite a bit, especially on the
private groups).
I’m
likely to get as much wrong this time in relative terms despite what I’ve
learned so keep that in mind (another way of saying that if you took any of
this as advice you might need your head read after the fact).
Some
ground rules:
- Private company valuations are based
on information and intel that runs from pretty good to pretty bad.
- I’ve extracted a few interesting
companies out of larger holding companies to feature because they are
important for market context when trying to understand what is creating
value – for example, InstantScripts, which is now owned by Wesfarmers or
Genie which is owned by Citadel.
- Some companies in the list are tech
companies and direct healthcare providers with employed or contracted
doctors as well but the ones on this list, usually telehealth companies,
are substantively providing care via platforms, usually telehealth.
- I’m a non-executive director of
MediRecords so I don’t include this company in the list, but I discuss
what is publicly known about the group because it’s relevant to
understanding value.
- A lot of these companies have at one
time or another paid the company that owns our sister publication Health Services Daily money in
the form of sponsorship, advertising and delegate and subscription
revenue. I list them at the end for transparency.
- I know I’ve missed some companies,
so if you are one and you are annoyed at not being in here, let me know.
Here’s
the basic league table to get things started:
Who survived from the top 11?
Readers
might find who remains from the original 11 list interesting as some sort of
starting point.
A
lot of them made the new list, but only because we extended it out to 30 from
11. Others didn’t make it to this year’s list at all – you can work out which
ones.
Only
Telstra Health, Best Practice and Genie Solutions actually stayed in the top
11.
Each
of these companies is platform-based, has a lot of share of healthcare
providers, good long-term market brands (eg, Medical Director inside Telstra
Health), access to capital and a strategy that either has them moving fast
already or on a path to transitioning their old server-bound platforms and
products to being cloud and FHIR-enabled.
Platforms,
cloud and FHIR, combined with existing market position, make up some obvious
themes on value, but there is a fair bit more going on.
The
first thing to note with this list is that a post-covid and ZIRP (zero interest
rate policy – or near zero) environment hasn’t been kind to tech companies
across the board in terms of valuation and share price (if they are public),
but especially so to health tech companies.
Not
to pick on anyone in particular, but as an example, Alcidion, which is an
interesting company with a hand in data analytics, clinical workflow, EMR
integrations and AI, had a share price of around 13c as covid started, 44c at
the peak of covid, and now it’s hovering around 5.4c. That’s despite landing
the odd good overseas and local contracts and continuing to increase its
revenue base robustly.
It’s
a similar picture for many of the smaller cap public digital health companies
in terms of share price and market cap.
Beamtree
is another interesting example.
Putting
aside its controversial (mainly to me, it seems) but clever virtual takeover of
not-for-profit hospital performance data group Health Roundtable, this group
hasn’t done much wrong in terms of building out revenue, a customer base and
evolving its strategy through and post-covid. But the market isn’t buying it
much. It had a pre-covid price of 15c, it got to a dizzy 66c mid-covid and
today it’s struggling to stay at 22c.
Investors
clearly got seduced by covid and lots of cheap money but they’re definitely not
feeling that love now.
The
bigger problem for many of the smaller cap publicly listed groups is valuation
multiples, which mid-covid tended to be measured in multiples of revenue of
anything from six to 12 times.
In
June 2021 Alcidion had a market cap of over $400 million on revenues of just
$26 million (a revenue multiple of over 15 times). In 2023 the group reported a
very respectable story of growth with revenues just over $40 million but its
market cap today is only $76 million, a revenue multiple of less than two.
What
is going on there?
One
question I have (as a novice) about these sorts of drops in valuation is this:
With
the federal government hot-to-trot on moving the dial on interoperability
across health through its program of “sharing by default”, and its newly
released Digital Health Blueprint and Action Plan 2023–2033, are
groups like Alcidion and Beamtree simply undervalued by an investor community
that has over-reacted to the tightening money environment? Is the investor
community not really understanding the bigger picture emerging around
government intent and policy in digital health and the inevitable emergence of
the cloud and AI in healthcare in Australia?
I
don’t have shares in either of those companies in case you’re wondering about
that.
Because
of my interest in MediRecords – I am a non-executive director and small
shareholder – I have not included them in the list above as I’m not actually
allowed to use the information I know about them which is not publicly
available – if I gave you revenue and market cap, I would not be guessing.
I
will, however, provide this quick short advertisement for them, because the
nature of this particular company is relevant to the context of value of most
other companies on the list.
MediRecords
is a group that, from its starting point, had cloud tech as its baseline. It
started about 10 years ago and, in retrospect, its reading of how fast cloud
would be adopted in Australia was probably way too optimistic, so it struggled
early on to get traction.
MediRecords
gets cloud and cloud-based connectivity and that is not actually that common
among some of the major established health tech platform groups in Australia
over the last 10 years.
That’s
because we have had government policy which did not encourage the sort of
innovation you’ve seen with cloud in healthcare in the UK, Europe and the US.
In
fact, at times government policy, both state and federal, has tended to
reinforce large tech platforms that are server-bound, can’t easily communicate
with other systems and can result in forms of information-blocking across
providers and to patients.
An
example would be state-based secure messaging contracts which still have years
to run and tend to lock in all the old tech platform vendors.
But
that is now changing at speed, which is why MediRecords would make this list if
I was allowed to put it in. It is sitting dead-centre of where technology
around cloud-based connectivity is heading, and it is attractive technology for
any provider who needs to connect providers and patients virtually and who want
to futureproof for interoperability around technologies like FHIR.
Suffice
to say anyone who knows how to develop sophisticated provider-based solutions
technology using cloud architecture and who has a longer-term skillset in
technologies like FHIR, are companies to start watching carefully.
It’s
still going to take us 5-10 years to get cloud-based provider platforms rolled
out and connected, but Australia, which has been way behind in building out
such technology, is now on that journey and the government is fully behind it,
having got its head around how much improvement the same technology has created
in the US and the UK.
If
you want the obvious other two trends to watch over cloud and interoperability
capability, it’s AI and analytics.
But
let’s shift a bit and look at a large cap which is shooting the lights out and
see if there is anything that gives us some insight into what is going on.
Pro
Medicus is by a mile our most valuable and successful healthtech company,
private or public, at a valuation today of over $10 billion. Here is its10-year
share price chart. It’s very un-healthcare like.
So,
$20 just as covid started with a market cap of $2.75 billion give or take on
revenues of about $57 million (revenue multiple of 48-ish), to a $100 share
price and a $10 billion market cap on revenues of $125 million (a revenue
multiple of about 80).
Possibly
Pro Medicus is so big it’s dangerous trying to learn anything from it about
most of the other companies on our list, which are, except for Telstra Health,
all valued at a long way under $1 billion. But the obvious things that stand
out is access to very big overseas markets in a very big and lucrative existing
sector – imaging – with cool platforms, data, AI and cloud-based technology
thrown in.
It
ticks a lot of boxes, but 80 times revenue does seem high given that globally
this is now a very competitive sector.
When
you read the list some of the small caps that are ticking a few of the same
boxes that Pro-Medicus does – apart from them not being in imaging and don’t
have global footprints – and their valuations are well under five times
revenue, it’s hard to understand what is happening.
It
feels like investors are confused post-covid.
In
order to get some more insight on what might be happening in terms of value
I’ve
split
the companies on the list into broad categories of technology in play. Breaking
the list into baskets of like companies makes it easier to see how value is
getting attached to a sector according to different business models.
In
order of multiples of revenue to market cap from top to bottom, the sectors are
imaging, telehealth, AI/analytics (but non-imaging), patient management and
other provider platforms moving to cloud (eg, Best Practice, Genie Solutions,
Healthshare), and patients apps.
Imaging
Imaging
is quite simply a very high-volume huge global market where AI and analytics
are increasing the value on the volume significantly because they are data
intensive technologies.
Australian
companies doing well in the list are Pro Medicus, Harrison AI, Volpara
Technologies, 4D Medical Limited and Enlitic.
Enlitic
has a revenue multiple to market cap of 95 times revenue. That feels crazy but
as I keep saying I’m a novice.
The
average of the basket of imaging groups in multiple of revenue to market cap is
just over 37 which is so far off the average of every other identified sector
it may just be a market way off on its own. Which doesn’t help us understand
much of what else is going on in the core healthtech companies in Australia.
Telehealth
Telehealth
is the next most valued sector and an interesting one because the current
market darling driving the average valuation of telehealth groups is
Eucalyptus, which is not so much a health platform as a marketing platform.
The
thing about the telehealth category from the get-go is that there isn’t any
tech being put in play that is particularly clever, is very healthcare specific
in IP terms, or has much of a barrier to entry.
That
leads to speculation that most of the current value is around a potential land
grab of patients and consolidation, not actual IP in technology.
Eucalyptus
is a marketing machine being driven by management who aren’t health
professionals at all but are more retail and tech entrepreneurs applying all
the digital platform marketing tricks that we’ve seen in big global platform
groups like Uber, AirBnB, even Facebook and Google.
The
multiple of Eucalyptus is 26 and the average multiple for the basket of
telehealth companies in the top 29 is just over 16.
This
group of companies is easier to understand in terms of value than the imaging
companies.
Almost
all the imaging companies have elements of AI and analytics in them which do
add value but also tend to make investors speculate in a sometimes silly
manner.
The
business mode of telehealth has none of the mystery and possible magic of AI
and analytics. It is not rocket science, doesn’t really have huge barriers to
entry, isn’t scalable in health like other markets such as media and finance,
and most of all, is seriously fraught with day-to-day and patient-to-patient
regulatory risk.
Just
last year Eucalyptus and Instant Scripts faced off in a regulatory adjustment
moment that might have been within a hair’s breadth of catastrophe. The Medical
Board of Australia decided that asynchronous consulting (via text or email
mostly), which most of these fast service telehealth consulting groups were
practising at scale, was not safe enough. They had to stop it and make sure
that real doctors contacted each patient at least by phone for at least one
consult before they were sent “the pills”.
This
created a giant extra cost for all these groups and was a clear warning that
regulation can kill single model businesses in health pretty quickly. It could
have been much worse.
This
particular incident might have slowed their growth and valuations down a
little, but at the same time it was happening, so was Ozempic, a reasonably new
weight-loss drug which came complete with “miracle drug” pre-marketing overseas
by Hollywood stars.
It
was manna from heaven, particularly for the marketing gurus at Eucalyptus.
But
Ozempic points to a pretty big problem for some of these telehealth companies,
most of whom only concentrate on high-volume single condition services
(although they don’t market themselves this way) such as weight loss, or,
increasingly, prescribed versions of cannabis.
Both
weight loss and what is effectively recreational legal cannabis are at this
point of time, land grabs.
How
many patients in Australia want postal order Ozempic or cannabis without the
fuss of facing off their GP?
It’s
probably a lot but, like Foxtel subscribers, there is a limit and when the
natural limit is reached, it’s hard to see what is beyond it. Because, no
matter what some of these single condition-focused telehealth groups like to
tell us, they aren’t about looking after a patient properly longitudinally for
all their complexity (mental health, weight, cardio, diabetes, RA, and so on
infinitum) because that simply is not profitable.
That
job is being left to GPs.
The
plan for these companies is to corner as many of these high-volume single
indication, “miracle drug direct” markets they can get, not just weight loss.
But
really, weight loss and possibly recreational cannibis is it.
Erectile
dysfunction and hair loss are already pretty crowded markets with very little
margin in them.
The
other problem with telehealth as a sector is what happens when big “other”
companies that have a deep existing relationship with the customers of these
telehealth groups, a lot of capital and a lot more data, decide they need to
add the same direct online services to their portfolio of other online
services?
Amazon
is coming and Wesfarmers (I love Bunnings, so they have my data and brand vote
to send me any of these drugs) already owns Instant Scripts.
Eucalyptus
may have already started showing the potential strain of facing off this
possible strategic challenge.
It
is now starting to market a “high end” concierge style version of their product
for the ego-driven and rich end of its current database.
“We’ve
identified you as a winner, and special, so we’re going to offer you a whole
lot of personalised services with an elite club feel to it, so go ahead, make
our day and pay us a premium for something that exists everywhere already
(seductive brands you pay for to show people what you’re about).”
Not
their marketing words, my translation.
And
my response, so far at least:
“No
thanks, just the quick and easy Ozempic please, and can you make it a lot
cheaper because if I go to my GP and ask them for it, it’s like 50% less for me
to get it.”
By
the way, my GP seems to actually really know me and like me … hmmm.
An
exclusive “rich person’s brand” health club?
That
feels very old, not new and innovative: an admission perhaps that there isn’t
much left in what really is a very basic mass-marketing platform business
model.
But
who knows.
I’m
not saying these companies aren’t going to grow further or aren’t clever at
getting people to part with their money based on ego or insecurity or both, and
won’t succeed building a high-end, high-paying database of rich health seekers.
I’m
just saying that if you look at the risk profile (health is a terrible market
for regulation and government interference), the competition coming and the
fact that what’s on offer is really just convenient Ozempic or cannabis, maybe
the current valuations are more about these groups’ sharp marketing teams than
the business model itself.
AI and analytics
AI
and analytics in health have explosive potential upside so it’s not surprising
that we have a few candidates on the list.
But
if you look at what is going on generally in AI investment you know that
there’s quite a bit of FOMO going on, which means you have to really do your
homework and understand what the AI proposition is, how it will fit into
inevitable regulatory frameworks (they’re coming) and what size of market it
will apply to.
Most
of the imaging companies in the top sector have AI and analytics as a core part
of what they do and we know that the AI in these systems is working and adding
a lot of value in a high-volume scalable market.
We
haven’t included any of the imaging companies in our AI and analytics top 30
basket.
The
multiple of what’s left is nearly eight which seems low but remember we aren’t
including any of the imaging and radiology companies in the basket. Most of the
ones on the list are either emerging or adapting older business models to
leverage of AI hype.
A
big part of AI emerging in Australia, which is so far unregulated, is the
assessment and recording of patient consults into notes, and then sometimes,
the development of things like automated care plans from these consults.
Such
technology has massive potential to reduce administrative burden on groups like
GPs and specialists and potentially generate new areas of income.
But
it’s also fraught with danger.
Currently
GPs do take patient notes manually and even put them in their patient
management systems. Recording a patient and what they say, then interpreting it
with AI might end up as legal dynamite. All these new apps say that the notes
or plans generated are always designed for review by the doctor post the
consult. But will that end up making more work or less?
AI
in EMRs looks like it has quite a way to go.
Lots
more here:
https://www.medicalrepublic.com.au/our-top-30-most-valuable-healthtech-companies/105683
Thanks
Jeremy for such a detailed and comprehensive review!
David.