This
appeared a few days ago:
The 9/11 attack was a clash of civilisations, two decades on and the
reality is ours is losing
Whereas older voters generally remain more pro-Israel than
pro-Palestinian, younger cohorts have swung the other way. Perhaps that’s
because to Gen Z, September 11 is a faint memory.
Niall Ferguson
On the day of the attack, Niall Ferguson was in Oxford,
staring incredulously at the pixelated live video of the World Trade Centre
twin towers first blazing.
12:00 AM September 20, 2025.
Last week’s azure September skies over New York brought back memories. Twenty-four years ago I was due to
give a lecture at New York University. The date of the lecture was September
12. I never flew.
On the day of the attacks, I sat in my study at Jesus College,
Oxford, staring incredulously at the pixelated live video of the World Trade
Centre twin towers first blazing, then collapsing. Not long after, in April
2002, I accepted a chair at the Stern School of Business at New York University
and resigned my Oxford professorship.
My motivation was partly the hereditary Scottish tendency to
march towards the sound of gunfire. As a teenager in 1914, my grandfather John
Ferguson had volunteered to fight the Germans. This seemed easier.
Regardless of the 9/11 attackers’ motives, I had a strong
objection to terrorism as a political method – a result of growing up in
Glasgow in the 1970s, when “the Troubles” in nearby Northern Ireland did more
than merely resonate.
My first impulse after the attacks, in a piece for The New
York Times, was to liken the sympathetic British reaction to 9/11 to the
American reaction to the Blitz of 1940-41.
A man stands in the rubble, and calls out asking if anyone
needs help, after the collapse of the first World Trade Center Tower. Picture:
Doug Kanter / AFP
But I also warned Americans to “steel themselves for a long,
inglorious kind of war that governments in Europe already know only too well”.
In wars against terrorists, I wrote, “there are no quick victories. The foe
does not line up his tanks for you to flatten, his ships for you to sink. His
troops live among you.”
Yet this was not the Provisional IRA. Re-reading a
transcript of Osama bin Laden’s first post-9/11 video, from November 3, 2001, I
am reminded of how explicitly he declared a war of religion. “People were
divided into two parts” after 9/11, he declared. “The first part supported
these strikes against US tyranny, while the second denounced them.
“The vast majority of the sons of the Islamic world were
happy about these strikes,” bin Laden went on, “because they believe that the
strikes were in reaction to the huge criminality practised by Israel and the
United States in Palestine and other Muslim countries.”
Al-Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden.
There were demonstrations of support for his action “from
the farthest point in the eastern part of the Islamic world to the farthest
point in the western part of the Islamic world”. This revealed the key reality:
“This war is fundamentally religious. The people of the East are Muslims. They
sympathised with Muslims against the people of the West, who are the
crusaders.”
With the passage of 2½ decades, it is startling just how
unambiguous bin Laden was about his religious motive. “Under no circumstances,”
he declared, “should we forget this enmity between us and the infidels. For the
enmity is based on creed … It is a question of faith, not a war against
terrorism.” The goal of all Muslims should now be to “resist the most
ferocious, serious and violent Crusade campaign against Islam ever since the
message was revealed” to Mohammed.
Bin Laden saw the war he was waging as a counter-attack –
“to take revenge for those innocent children in Palestine, Iraq, southern
Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir and The Philippines”. The US president, George W. Bush,
might be the latest “crusader”, who “carried the cross and raised its banner
high”, but bin Laden traced his war back to the aftermath of World War I when
“the whole Islamic world fell under the crusader banner … and Palestine was
occupied by the British”. Now the tables had been turned. And he had turned
them with just 19 men whose faith exalted martyrdom.
George W Bush standing next to retired firefighter Bob
Beckwith, speaks to volunteers and firemen as he surveys the damage at the site
of the World Trade Center in on September 14 2001. Picture: AFP
You can see why, at the time, many commentators saw 9/11 as
vindicating Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, whose seminal essay
on The Clash of Civilisations had been published in 1993, as well as Princeton
scholar Bernard Lewis, who had long argued that Islam was chronically unable to
modernise.
My wife, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, was born in Somalia and shared
this view, not because she was a scholar of Islam but because she was a Muslim
– and, indeed, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood. In September 2001,
she was working at a political think tank in the Netherlands, having sought
asylum there in 1992 to escape war-torn Mogadishu and an arranged marriage.
Author Ayaan Hirsi Ali
In her memoir, Infidel, she recalls how, after hearing bin
Laden’s video, she “picked up the (Koran) and the hadith and started looking
through them, to check. I hated to do it, because I knew that I would find bin
Laden’s quotations in there.” She shot to notoriety by telling the Dutch that
the 9/11 attackers were simply following the Prophet Mohammed’s injunction to
wage holy war.
Over the past 24 years I have valiantly tried to see 9/11
differently – not as a civilisational clash between Islam and “the West” but as
something that fit better into my own secular frame of reference. Raised an
atheist, trained as an economic historian, I felt obliged to look behind what I
took to be the facade of religious zealotry.
A decade after the attacks, in a piece I wrote for The New
York Times Magazine, I portrayed them as the product of four underlying
historical trends. First, the spread of terrorism from the Middle East and
Europe to the US. Second, the post-2000 economic downturn, combined with
widening inequality between nations and a coming oil shock, possibly compounded
by a Saudi revolution akin to the one that overthrew the shah in Iran in 1979.
(I completely failed to foresee the shale oil revolution and bought into the
“peak oil” myth.) Third, the transition of American global power from informal
to formal imperialism. And last, the fragmentation of the multicultural polity.
(“Rather than anticipating a clash between monolithic civilisations, we should
expect a continued process of political disintegration as religious and ethnic
conflicts challenge the integrity of existing multicultural nation-states.”)
Missing in this – and in much of my work that followed – was
Islam.
In The War of the World (2006), I got a little closer to
Huntington, portraying 1979 as a much bigger turning point than 2001 in terms
of the demographic as well as political rise of Islam, a point I returned to in
Civilization: The West and the Rest (2011). However, laboriously quantifying
every war since Huntington’s essay had appeared, I argued that most conflicts
since 1993 had, in reality, been within rather than between civilisations. In
The Square and the Tower (2017), I applied network theory to the problem,
showing how al-Qaeda itself was a network within a much larger network of
Islamist organisations; and that its expansion in response to the invasion of
Iraq ultimately necessitated a networked response (in the form of General Stan
McChrystal’s Joint Special Operations Command). Most recently, in Doom (2021),
I downgraded 9/11 to just another disaster, and not a very big one: “In terms
of excess mortality, April 2020 in New York City was … three and a half times
worse than September 2001, the month of the 9/11 terrorist attack.”
00:12 / 05:45
‘Too dangerous’: Pro-Palestine mob hijacks Albanese’s office
On reflection, I see that I was overthinking the event. Or
perhaps under-thinking it.
Huntington, Lewis and my wife were right.
In Huntington’s original formulation, “the fundamental
source of conflict” in the world after the Cold War would be cultural; “the
principal conflicts of global politics” would be “between nations and groups of
different civilisations” – “Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu,
Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African”. In particular,
Huntington predicted, the “centuries-old military interaction between the West
and Islam” could become “more virulent”. He also foresaw a “Confucian-Islamic
military connection” that would culminate in a conflict between “The West and
the Rest”.
Among the younger generation of proto-woke Ivy League
professors, Huntington was widely mocked for his “essentialism”. But consider,
with Huntington’s argument in mind, all that has happened since September 2001.
Terrorism has largely been contained in the US and EU,
though not globally. In that sense, we won the “war on terror”, which was
successfully displaced from the US to the periphery. It was ultimately defeated
in Iraq, though not in Afghanistan. Today, as a result, terrorism in the world
looks very different from what I foresaw in 2001. According to the Global
Terrorism Index 2025, published by the Institute for Economics & Peace, the
top five countries most impacted by terrorism last year were: Burkina Faso,
Pakistan, Syria, Mali and Niger. Globally, terrorism peaked in 2014-15. In
countries such as Iraq, it has declined dramatically. (In 2007, terrorists
claimed 6249 lives in Iraq. Last year, the total was just 59.)
In the US, it is widely asserted, white supremacists now
pose a bigger terrorist threat than Islamists – although the attack in New
Orleans on January 1, 2025, when Shamsud-Din Jabbar killed 14 people by driving
a pick-up truck into a crowd on Bourbon Street, is a reminder that Islamic
State has not entirely gone away. We now know who murdered Charlie Kirk, and a
white supremacist he was not.
Still, the latest Global Terrorism Threat Assessment by the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies makes clear just how wrong I was
in 2001 to anticipate a sustained campaign of jihadist terrorism in the US. Say
what you like about our national security agencies, they won that war.
Yet nonviolent radicalisation (what Islam calls dawa as
opposed to violent jihad) has advanced significantly everywhere in the Western
world, wherever there are Muslim communities. The critical point – as my wife
explained in a book on the subject – is that Islamism as a deeply illiberal
political ideology does not need to engage in acts of terrorism to spread.
I never cease to marvel at the ingenuity with which the
Muslim Brotherhood and other proselytising organisations spread their networks,
through mosques, Islamic centres, schools, colleges and local politics.
Consider only the effectiveness of the Council of American-Islamic Relations,
founded in 1994, which today boasts on its website of having “100+ active
lawsuits” and “600,000+ Legislative Action Alerts”, whatever that means. It has
almost 30 offices throughout the country.
Most people who encounter CAIR take it to be something like
the Anti-Defamation League for Muslims – a civil rights organisation that just
happens to be concerned about the rights of Muslims. But it is not that at all.
Ten countries have recognised the non-existent Palestinian
state since October 7, including three European Union EU member states,
Ireland, Slovenia, and Spain. Canada, France, Australia and the United Kingdom
Britain are itching to join them. Picture: AFP
Rather, it is more like a front organisation for the Muslim
Brotherhood of America. In a recent article, Ayaan has brilliantly described
the many ingenious ways that CAIR exploits the institutions of our open
society, most recently settling a lawsuit to avoid revealing its sources of
funding.
Good luck following the money. In her words: “The North
American Islamic Trust (NAIT) controls mosque properties and financial assets.
The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) lends the Brotherhood a degree of
religious legitimacy. The American Muslim Council (AMC) works the political
front, cutting deals and building alliances. The Muslim American Society (MAS)
runs operations on the ground, embedding itself firmly in local communities. In
universities, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) shapes the
narrative. On campuses, the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA) targets the next
wave of recruits. The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) and Young Muslims
(YM) focus on families and youth.”
Even the United Arab Emirates has proscribed CAIR as a
terrorist organisation. Yet dozens of Democratic legislators are on the record
on the CAIR website, praising its work as they doubtless also praise the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
A complementary effort is the way Qatar – the largest source
of foreign donations to US universities since reporting began in 1986 – funnels
money into academia. According to the Network Contagion Research Institute, as
reported in The Free Press, nearly a third of Qatari donations to American
colleges – more than $US2bn – were given between 2021 and 2024. As Mitchell G.
Bard shows in Arab Funding of American Universities (2025), this money is one
of the reasons college campuses have become such hotbeds of anti-Semitism in
recent years.
It is not just that the West has been successfully
penetrated by an antagonistic civilisation that fundamentally rejects the
fundamental division between religion and politics – church and state – that
lies at the heart of both Christianity and Judaism. The West is also being
geopolitically outmanoeuvred by “the rest” in just the way Huntington foresaw.
Former Hamas leaders Ismail Haniya and Yahya Sinwar wave
during a rally marking the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Islamist
movement in 2017. Picture: AFP
Contrast the global order after 9/11 with the global order
today. We have come a long way since NATO secretary-general George Robertson’s
statement on September 11, 2001: “Our message to the people of the United
States is … ‘We are with you’.”
In the past three years, Zbig Brzezinski’s worst-case
scenario has come about. “Potentially, the most dangerous scenario,” he wrote
in The Grand Chessboard (1997), “would be a grand coalition of China, Russia,
and perhaps Iran, an ‘antihegemonic’ coalition united not by ideology but by
complementary grievances”.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that grand coalition
has come into being, with North Korea as a fourth member. The “axis of
upheaval” (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) is now co-operating in
military, economic and diplomatic ways.
Moreover, the Trump administration’s combative treatment of
US allies (the EU, Japan, South Korea) and neutrals (Brazil, India and
Switzerland), not least with respect to trade policy, is alienating not only
the traditionally non-aligned but also key partners.
The upshot is that Israel is now virtually alone in fighting
against the Islamists, so that even the US wants plausible deniability when, as
earlier this month, the Israeli Air Force strikes the leadership of Hamas in
the Qatari capital, Doha.
The point is that the clash of civilisation continues. Now
ask yourself: Who’s winning?
The Hamas attack on Israel two years ago was essentially an
Israeli 9/11 (worse in relative terms). But compare the global reactions.
UN Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted unanimously on
September 28, 2001, called on all member states to freeze terrorist financing,
pass anti-terrorism laws, prevent suspected terrorists from travelling across
international borders, and screen asylum-seekers for possible terrorist ties.
This was an unprecedented show of international unity.
By contrast, no Security Council resolution could be passed
in the wake of October 7. UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/21 – which
called for an “immediate” and “sustained” humanitarian truce and “cessation of
hostilities” in Gaza and condemned “all acts of violence aimed at Palestinian
and Israeli civilians” – was introduced by Jordan on behalf of a group of Arab
states. When it was adopted on October 27, 2023, 121 voted in favour, 44
abstained, 14 absented themselves and only 14 (including Israel and the US)
voted against.
This video grab from footage released by the Israeli Hostage
and Missing Families Forum campaign group shows what the group described as
Israeli female soldiers being captured by Hamas during the October 7 attack on
Israel
Ten countries have recognised the non-existent Palestinian
state since October 7, including three EU member states, Ireland, Slovenia, and
Spain. Canada, France, Australia and Britain are itching to join them.
In short, comparing the world today with that of 24 years
ago, I am tempted to say bin Laden lost the war on terror but is winning the
clash of civilisations. That’s not to say his particular brand of Salafist
jihadism is winning; it can even be argued that it’s in decline. Bin Laden’s
creed was always too uncompromising to form alliances of convenience. By
contrast, the pro-Palestinian “global intifada” is much more omnivorous, and
can easily absorb the old left (Marxism and pan-Arabism) and the new (anti-globalism
and wokeism).
Demographically, Islam is certainly winning. According to
Pew Research (June 2025), “The number of Muslims around the world grew 21 per
cent between 2010 and 2020, from 1.7 billion to 2.0 billion.” That was twice as
fast as the rest of the world’s population, increasing the Muslim share from 24
per cent to 26 per cent. Earlier research by Pew (from 2015) forecast that “if
current trends continue, by 2050 the number of Muslims will nearly equal the
number of Christians around the world”. In Europe, Pew estimated, Muslims would
make up 10 per cent of the overall population, up from 5.9 per cent in 2010. In
the US, Muslims would outnumber Jews. This does not seem implausible.
00:06 / 18:57
John Howard slams Albanese’s move to recognise Palestine as
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Already in Britain, Muhammad has overtaken Noah as the top
name for baby boys in England and Wales, having been in the top 10 since 2016.
At the same time, Western civilisation today is so much more
divided than it was 24 years ago. The public response to October 7 illuminated
the divisions. Whereas older voters generally remain more pro-Israel than
pro-Palestinian, younger cohorts have swung the other way. Perhaps that’s
because to Gen Z, September 11 is a faint memory – as distant as the Cuban
missile crisis and John F. Kennedy’s assassination were to my generation. But
it’s also because the Islamists have done such a good job of co-opting the
campus radicals, somehow overriding the cognitive dissonance in slogans such as
“Queers for Palestine”, while tapping the anti-Semitism that still lurks on the
far right.
According to Brookings, “young Republicans aged 18-49 have
shifted from 35 per cent having an unfavourable view of Israel to 50 per cent
unfavourable … Among Democrats, there has been an increase of 62 per cent to 71
per cent (with an unfavourable view of Israel) in the 18 to 49-year-old
demographic … Only 9 per cent of those aged 18 to 34 approve of Israel’s
military actions in Gaza.”
Supporters of Yemen's Houthi’s gather with pictures of
Hamas' slain leader Yahya Sinwar during a rally last year. Picture: AFP
A recent poll in Britain by Campaign Against Anti-Semitism
revealed a striking shift in attitudes towards Jews. Once again, the swing
towards anti-Semitism is more pronounced among the young: “Forty-five per cent
of the British public … believes that Israel treats the Palestinians like the
Nazis treated the Jews … 60 per cent of young people believe this.
“Forty-nine per cent of 18-24-year-olds are uncomfortable
spending time with people who openly support Israel.
“Only 31 per cent of young voters agree that Israel has a
right to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people.
“Twenty-six per cent of the British public believes that
Israel can get away with anything because its supporters control the media.
“Nineteen per cent of young people believe that the Hamas
attack on Israel was justified.”
Such attitudes can be found in Britain on both the political
left and the political right. A third of Labour voters say they are
uncomfortable spending time with people who openly support Israel, as do 54 per
cent of Green Party voters, 15 per cent of whom believe Hamas’s attack on
Israel was justified. But almost one in four supporters of the rapidly growing
Reform UK party, led by Nigel Farage, believe Jewish people “chase money more
than other people do”.
During the Cold War, the West was often referred to as a
“Judaeo-Christian” civilisation. That term is starting to seem like an
anachronism. Two years ago, another bin Laden pronouncement – his Letter to
America, originally published on the first anniversary of September 11 –
enjoyed a sudden resurgence of interest, not least because its attacks on the
power of American Jews seemed to strike a chord with young users of TikTok.
Palestinians celebrate their return after crossing the
border fence with Israel on October 7, 2023. Picture: AFP
One popular video showed a young woman brushing her hair
with the caption, “When you read Osama bin Laden’s letter to America and you
realise you’ve been lied to your whole entire life.” At one point in November
2023, a TikTok search for #lettertoamerica found videos with 14.2 million
views. In total, about 300 videos were posted under that hashtag.
Walking the streets of New York last week, I felt old. To my
children, my students and my employees, September 11 is not a memory. It is not
even a historical fact. It is something people argue about on social media.
As I write, Tucker Carlson has just told Piers Morgan that
an “FBI document” indicated “an Israeli spy ring in the United States … knew
9/11 was coming”. The reality is, of course, that only the conspirators
themselves knew that. They also knew, very clearly, why they were going to do
it.
It has taken me all these years to understand that 9/11
really was a clash of civilisations. And it has taken me until now finally to
face the reality that ours is losing.
Niall Ferguson is the Milbank Family senior fellow at the
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and a senior faculty fellow of the
Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. He is the
author of 16 books, including The Pity of War, The House of Rothschild, and
Kissinger, 1923-1968: The Idealist. This essay originally was published in The
Free Press.
Here is the
link:
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/the-911-attack-was-a-clash-of-civilisations-two-decades-on-and-the-reality-is-ours-is-losing/news-story/dc0eb611984be202af319fae183239cd
Hard to
believe so many years have passed and sadly not much seems to have changed for
the better….
We seem to
be rather slow learners as a group! I am not sure great progress has been made which is rather sad!
David.
