The international research firm has recently released a report entitled Australian Hospital Information Systems Markets (Frost & Sullivan, March 2006).
The summary of the report makes some interesting points.
The first is that they see the key driver of increasing investments in Health IT as being driven by a growing demand for safer and improved healthcare noting there are ambitious plans underway in a number of states and at the Commonwealth level.
The second point they make is that there is a strategic shift in healthcare IT requirement that is expected to boost market growth. They go on to say:
“Hospitals in Australia are replacing legacy systems with sophisticated and integrated ones. Similarly, there is a strategic shift from the adoption of administrative systems to clinical systems and healthcare providers of various states and territories are looking at integrating their IT systems under programs such as the nation-wide electronic health records. Australia is slowly moving toward an integrated healthcare delivery structure, where healthcare agencies will be linked with each other, notes the analyst of this research service. Information systems are expected to play a vital role in this structure and there is likely to be an increased uptake of hospital information systems to allow seamless integration between the legacy and contemporary healthcare information systems.”
I must say that while the shift to more clinically based computing is certainly evident in most States I am less sure there could really be said to be a move towards “an integrated healthcare delivery structure” really underway as yet. As of 2006 the State / Commonwealth divides are as real and as damaging as ever in my view.
Integration between the legacy and contemporary healthcare information systems is also very much a work in progress I would suggest and is certainly not seamless.
The following would seem to be an important paragraph and I would read this as suggesting care is needed before making major investments by vendors of hospital systems in Australia.
“Nevertheless, despite these positive developments, participants must remember that there has been chronic under-investment in healthcare IT in Australia, leading to the adoption of fragmented and inefficient information systems by the healthcare providers. Further, there is also a huge level of penetration of legacy systems in Australian hospitals and migration to packaged software could pose considerable challenges.”
In the last section they say the market for clinical systems holds high growth potential. To quote:
“With hospitals replacing low-quality patient administration and financial systems with standardized and integrated solutions, the administrative HIS segment currently accounts for a majority of the market revenues. However, public and private hospitals are now showing considerable interest in clinical solutions and health departments are expected to allocate more funds for the adoption of clinical systems.
Consequently, there is growing interest in clinical systems such as radiology information systems (RIS), picture archiving and communications systems (PACS) and electronic medical records (EMR), which is expected to accelerate the growth of the overall Australian HIS markets.”
This is all true, however the next paragraph is more problematic.
“Considering the shift toward integrating the IT systems, huge contracts are expected to be awarded in the Australian HIS markets in the coming years. With the health departments of various states and territories planning numerous IT initiatives during the next few years, vendors need to enhance client relationships through better customer service and scheduled project completion, says the analyst. Also, with the increasing demand for clinical solutions, developing solutions tailored to local needs is likely to evolve as a market necessity.”
In recent times we have seen major decisions taken for clinical hospital software in the public sector in NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia. This really leaves only Qld and Western Australia to declare their hands. Qld is likely to be very conservative after the problems of the recent past (i.e. will probably follow NSW / Victorian approach if they are seen to be successful) and WA has developed its Health IT Strategy (HealthTec founded in January 2006) ) but as far as I know is probably a good way off making procurement decisions. WA does, however, need a refresh of all hospital systems sooner rather than later according to my WA correspondents.
Overall I see this report as being rather too optimistic as far as new prospects are concerned while having correctly identified the general trend to raised investments in the clinical sector. The major spending over the next few years I envisage as being focussed on implementation and integration services rather than software purchases.
Work on implementation will run for the next five to ten years so – other than Qld and WA - I suspect a quiet time will be had in the public sector for the next decade.
The private hospital sector, on the other hand, will gradually come under more pressure to provide clinical hospital systems, and I would expect this is where the major hospital market will be over the next five years in terms of new system sales.
David.
Thursday, November 30, 2006
Tuesday, November 28, 2006
Questions for Minister Abbott to Ask – How to Decide whether to Continue NEHTA.
An article by Julian Bajkowski of The Australian Financial Review on the 28th Nov 2006 suggests that the AMA is seeking to have Health Minister Tony Abbott to create legally enforceable standards that govern the sale and use of electronic health systems.
Quoting an AMA position paper obtained by The Australian Financial Review we are told that medical practitioners remain deeply concerned about various state electronic health initiatives. We are also told the AMA fears the plans, if not properly governed, will recreate rail gauge incompatibilities - various state health systems will be unable to share critical patient data at a clinical level.
This will come as no shock to any reader of this blog who will be aware that for the last eight months I have been suggesting there is a critical pressing need for the development of a consensus based National E-Health Plan, Business Case and Implementation Plan. The AMA is dead right that nationally E-Health is in one serious hole and urgent action is required to correct the situation.
As my manifesto of last Friday made clear I hope we can lift from the present rather messy base. To quote
“My view is that right now there is a lot of unfocussed, uncoordinated activity going on (some good and some bad) and that it is the time to take a step back, work out, at a national level, what is needed and how best to get there. As a nation in 2000/1 we had some good ideas with HealthConnect but we then lost the plot and momentum by early 2005. We can’t afford another wasted four years.
In the blog I hope to alert and warn where I see mistakes being made and lessons we should already have learnt being repeated. Hopefully the assumptions above will point to those things which need to be assured before investments are made.
Overall I am hoping to foster the change from a heard of cats to a sleek shoal of fish all swimming towards real, practical and achievable goals.”
The article also goes on to say – as its second main point – that the continuing funding of NEHTA beyond 2008/09 is now under review by the Health Minister. This review is timely as NEHTA has now been operational for a decent period. As I stated previously “My view is that unless there are some really useful and practical outcomes within the next six months (i.e. NEHTA having been in action for just on three years (Authorised by COAG July 2004) serious questions will start being asked. The opportunity cost of all this inactivity is really astronomical in terms of patient suffering and lives lost.”
Before continuing funding there are a number of questions I suggest Mr Abbot should ask:
1. Has NEHTA developed and articulated the consensus based National E-Health Plan, Business Case and Implementation Plan which is needed to frame all other E-Health activity and investment? If not, why not?
2. With the effective gutting of both the E-Health Implementation Branch of DoHA and the Australian Health Information Council (AHIC) should NEHTA have been more aware of the strategic gap at the core of Australian E-Health an moved promptly to address this gap?
3. Have NEHTA’s interventions and work products contributed positively to the development of the E-Health industry in Australia through the provision of clear, usable advice and technical frameworks?
4. Have clinical users of E-Health system seen a perceptible improvement in the quality and availability of satisfactory systems which interoperate and also allow for the smooth and reliable communication of clinical information?
5. Has the agenda of improving Clinical Decision Support within E-Health Systems to assist with the quality and safety of patient care seen a significant advance since NEHTA’s inception?
6. Has access to critical clinical information in life-saving and emergent situations been improved in the last 2-3 years under NEHTA’s guidance?
7. Is the present governance of NEHTA with a CEO level board and advisory committees whose membership is not made public the right way to manage a critical national effort such as the National E-Health Agenda?
8. Has NEHTA’s cross jurisdictional nature lead to a much improved alignment of the E-Health initiatives in each of the States and Territories?
9. Are the stakeholders who are involved in the delivery of E-Health products and services finding it easier or harder to make progress with NEHTA’s presence in the arena?
10. Is the value obtained for the investment in NEHTA becoming clear to the extent that funding should be continued or is a major strategic re-assessment required?
11. Should Australia have both NEHTA and Standards Australia involved in E-Health Standards setting or should this role be clearly placed in one place of the other?
12. Is it realistic for NEHTA to continue to work on a National Shared EHR when the financial, technical and human aspects of such a project remain so uncertain and problematic?
13. Why is it that NEHTA has not addressed the issues around clinical software quality and certification despite significant clinical and industry concern that guidance is important and needs careful consideration?
14. Does NEHTA have adequate clinical input given its technical importance to the health system?
It seems to me that unless most of these questions can be confidently answered in the affirmative by the Minister then a serious strategic review is virtually mandatory.
The more astute reader may notice that the emphasis in the list above is on strategic rather than technical issues. This actually offers the Minister another approach. He could formally re-constitute AHIC and provide it with a strategically trained and aware E-Health secretariat and have NEHTA then change its role to a technical delivery arm for the AHIC strategy. This would be a very, smart choice. To leave things the way they are would not be.
David.
Quoting an AMA position paper obtained by The Australian Financial Review we are told that medical practitioners remain deeply concerned about various state electronic health initiatives. We are also told the AMA fears the plans, if not properly governed, will recreate rail gauge incompatibilities - various state health systems will be unable to share critical patient data at a clinical level.
This will come as no shock to any reader of this blog who will be aware that for the last eight months I have been suggesting there is a critical pressing need for the development of a consensus based National E-Health Plan, Business Case and Implementation Plan. The AMA is dead right that nationally E-Health is in one serious hole and urgent action is required to correct the situation.
As my manifesto of last Friday made clear I hope we can lift from the present rather messy base. To quote
“My view is that right now there is a lot of unfocussed, uncoordinated activity going on (some good and some bad) and that it is the time to take a step back, work out, at a national level, what is needed and how best to get there. As a nation in 2000/1 we had some good ideas with HealthConnect but we then lost the plot and momentum by early 2005. We can’t afford another wasted four years.
In the blog I hope to alert and warn where I see mistakes being made and lessons we should already have learnt being repeated. Hopefully the assumptions above will point to those things which need to be assured before investments are made.
Overall I am hoping to foster the change from a heard of cats to a sleek shoal of fish all swimming towards real, practical and achievable goals.”
The article also goes on to say – as its second main point – that the continuing funding of NEHTA beyond 2008/09 is now under review by the Health Minister. This review is timely as NEHTA has now been operational for a decent period. As I stated previously “My view is that unless there are some really useful and practical outcomes within the next six months (i.e. NEHTA having been in action for just on three years (Authorised by COAG July 2004) serious questions will start being asked. The opportunity cost of all this inactivity is really astronomical in terms of patient suffering and lives lost.”
Before continuing funding there are a number of questions I suggest Mr Abbot should ask:
1. Has NEHTA developed and articulated the consensus based National E-Health Plan, Business Case and Implementation Plan which is needed to frame all other E-Health activity and investment? If not, why not?
2. With the effective gutting of both the E-Health Implementation Branch of DoHA and the Australian Health Information Council (AHIC) should NEHTA have been more aware of the strategic gap at the core of Australian E-Health an moved promptly to address this gap?
3. Have NEHTA’s interventions and work products contributed positively to the development of the E-Health industry in Australia through the provision of clear, usable advice and technical frameworks?
4. Have clinical users of E-Health system seen a perceptible improvement in the quality and availability of satisfactory systems which interoperate and also allow for the smooth and reliable communication of clinical information?
5. Has the agenda of improving Clinical Decision Support within E-Health Systems to assist with the quality and safety of patient care seen a significant advance since NEHTA’s inception?
6. Has access to critical clinical information in life-saving and emergent situations been improved in the last 2-3 years under NEHTA’s guidance?
7. Is the present governance of NEHTA with a CEO level board and advisory committees whose membership is not made public the right way to manage a critical national effort such as the National E-Health Agenda?
8. Has NEHTA’s cross jurisdictional nature lead to a much improved alignment of the E-Health initiatives in each of the States and Territories?
9. Are the stakeholders who are involved in the delivery of E-Health products and services finding it easier or harder to make progress with NEHTA’s presence in the arena?
10. Is the value obtained for the investment in NEHTA becoming clear to the extent that funding should be continued or is a major strategic re-assessment required?
11. Should Australia have both NEHTA and Standards Australia involved in E-Health Standards setting or should this role be clearly placed in one place of the other?
12. Is it realistic for NEHTA to continue to work on a National Shared EHR when the financial, technical and human aspects of such a project remain so uncertain and problematic?
13. Why is it that NEHTA has not addressed the issues around clinical software quality and certification despite significant clinical and industry concern that guidance is important and needs careful consideration?
14. Does NEHTA have adequate clinical input given its technical importance to the health system?
It seems to me that unless most of these questions can be confidently answered in the affirmative by the Minister then a serious strategic review is virtually mandatory.
The more astute reader may notice that the emphasis in the list above is on strategic rather than technical issues. This actually offers the Minister another approach. He could formally re-constitute AHIC and provide it with a strategically trained and aware E-Health secretariat and have NEHTA then change its role to a technical delivery arm for the AHIC strategy. This would be a very, smart choice. To leave things the way they are would not be.
David.
Monday, November 27, 2006
Personal Health Records – What a Good Idea Mr Hockey!
In this post I want to make a simple suggestion. That is that Mr Hockey should reward those people who register for their Access Card with the capability – rather than store health information on the card itself – for citizens to enter information on their health in a standardised form on a national Personal Health Record server access to which is provided by provision of the card.
The standard format to be used can be a matter of discussion but the basic elements of the contents could be as follows. Note: All content would be optional for each individual patient as would be use of the record as a whole be totally optional.
1. Very basic demographics (derived from the card record) – Name, Age, Sex, Current Address and a Date Last Reviewed by Patient, Pharmacist or GP.
2. Ordinary Regular GP with phone number etc
3. Allergies (simple record of what substance, what reaction and had a doctor confirmed the validity of the allergy (Y/N).
4. Important Family Medical History if individual wants to record it (e.g. heart attacks run in family etc).
5. Known Chronic Illnesses (e.g. diabetes, epilepsy, arthritis etc) and important past surgery.
6. Listing of Current Medications and Dosage and Frequency.
7. Results of Tests and Investigations – these would be sourced from the GP or specialist and placed on the record for the patient – and marked with the contact details of the source of the information
8. A recurrent simple record where the individual could record a date, time and measurement (e.g. a blood pressure reading, spirometry or patient measured blood sugar levels)
9. A place for notes of information such as appointments, immunisations etc as free text.
10. The capacity to store important health related documents in any of the standard formats as an attachment if needed for any specific reason.
The record would be only accessible if the card owner placed the card in a reader in the presence of an appropriate health professional – for initial creation or updating – or via the use of a secure one-time validated web site log-on. (e.g. you enter your ID, your e-mail or SMS phone number is already stored on the Access Card database – and that is used to send you back a one time usable password that expires in say one hour.).
Anyone trying to wrongly access your account needs to know your ID Number, your phone number or e-mail (not on the card) and to be expecting the password to arrive. This would be more secure than current internet banking which millions of people use daily.
I would envisage Medicare would provide an annual payment in the form of a standard Medicare benefit for your GP to review and update your record on an annual basis. A small fee could also be provided to pharmacists to update the medication record.
The advantages of this proposal are:
1. The user owns and is responsible for the record – but the record can be flagged as having been medically reviewed on a particular date.
2. Slightly more technical information is provided by the GP for the patient and again this process provides more review.
3. The system is totally voluntary and indeed other providers may be able to set up similar services (e.g. health funds, banks) (it would be important the format be standardised properly – perhaps NEHTA could own that problem).
4. A lot of the benefits potential of HealthConnect like proposals could be realised quite cheaply.
5. The proposal, intrinsically, ensures those with complex health issues are those who would set up such a record and it is those who we need the most information available for in emergent and multi health provider (team) situations.
6. The record is totally voluntary and avoids any privacy concerns – with a Government or other provider guarantee of strict security enforcement.
7. The system could make a real contribution to continuity of care of patients within the community.
8. It would be very easy to design the record to be downloadable to GP computing systems to provide very useful background information when a patient changes practice or location. Also has the benefit of providing an off-line backup of possibly important records.
It should be noted that this proposal would provide a very useful testbed for shared EHR possibilities, infrastructure and utility and, if sensibly designed, permit migration to a more clinically orientated system over time. There is also the possibility that an interested consortium could undertake the entire project with funding from a range of sources possible (Health Insurers, Users, Government or a mix of some or all.).
I wonder will the policy gurus give the idea a careful review. I hope so.
David.
The standard format to be used can be a matter of discussion but the basic elements of the contents could be as follows. Note: All content would be optional for each individual patient as would be use of the record as a whole be totally optional.
1. Very basic demographics (derived from the card record) – Name, Age, Sex, Current Address and a Date Last Reviewed by Patient, Pharmacist or GP.
2. Ordinary Regular GP with phone number etc
3. Allergies (simple record of what substance, what reaction and had a doctor confirmed the validity of the allergy (Y/N).
4. Important Family Medical History if individual wants to record it (e.g. heart attacks run in family etc).
5. Known Chronic Illnesses (e.g. diabetes, epilepsy, arthritis etc) and important past surgery.
6. Listing of Current Medications and Dosage and Frequency.
7. Results of Tests and Investigations – these would be sourced from the GP or specialist and placed on the record for the patient – and marked with the contact details of the source of the information
8. A recurrent simple record where the individual could record a date, time and measurement (e.g. a blood pressure reading, spirometry or patient measured blood sugar levels)
9. A place for notes of information such as appointments, immunisations etc as free text.
10. The capacity to store important health related documents in any of the standard formats as an attachment if needed for any specific reason.
The record would be only accessible if the card owner placed the card in a reader in the presence of an appropriate health professional – for initial creation or updating – or via the use of a secure one-time validated web site log-on. (e.g. you enter your ID, your e-mail or SMS phone number is already stored on the Access Card database – and that is used to send you back a one time usable password that expires in say one hour.).
Anyone trying to wrongly access your account needs to know your ID Number, your phone number or e-mail (not on the card) and to be expecting the password to arrive. This would be more secure than current internet banking which millions of people use daily.
I would envisage Medicare would provide an annual payment in the form of a standard Medicare benefit for your GP to review and update your record on an annual basis. A small fee could also be provided to pharmacists to update the medication record.
The advantages of this proposal are:
1. The user owns and is responsible for the record – but the record can be flagged as having been medically reviewed on a particular date.
2. Slightly more technical information is provided by the GP for the patient and again this process provides more review.
3. The system is totally voluntary and indeed other providers may be able to set up similar services (e.g. health funds, banks) (it would be important the format be standardised properly – perhaps NEHTA could own that problem).
4. A lot of the benefits potential of HealthConnect like proposals could be realised quite cheaply.
5. The proposal, intrinsically, ensures those with complex health issues are those who would set up such a record and it is those who we need the most information available for in emergent and multi health provider (team) situations.
6. The record is totally voluntary and avoids any privacy concerns – with a Government or other provider guarantee of strict security enforcement.
7. The system could make a real contribution to continuity of care of patients within the community.
8. It would be very easy to design the record to be downloadable to GP computing systems to provide very useful background information when a patient changes practice or location. Also has the benefit of providing an off-line backup of possibly important records.
It should be noted that this proposal would provide a very useful testbed for shared EHR possibilities, infrastructure and utility and, if sensibly designed, permit migration to a more clinically orientated system over time. There is also the possibility that an interested consortium could undertake the entire project with funding from a range of sources possible (Health Insurers, Users, Government or a mix of some or all.).
I wonder will the policy gurus give the idea a careful review. I hope so.
David.
Sunday, November 26, 2006
Healthelink – Trundling Towards Failure?
Its now been about eight months (March, 2006) since the NSW Health Minister announced the commencement of the Healthelink trials in the Hunter and at Westmead so it seems about time to consider what has been reported or leaked out about progress.
The concept of the trial is as follows:
Healthcare providers (hospitals, GPs, diagnostic providers and community services etc) in two specific areas treating two specific categories of patients (the 65 + in the Hunter and the young children in Westmead) have an encounter record created each time they attend a participating facility.
The idea is that over time a longitudinal health record on each individual will be built up.’
On each encounter both demographic and clinical information will be captured.
The encounter from the GP, for example, will capture the following information automatically at the end of a consultation. Quoting directly from an Healthelink information sheet.
“The following fields will be extracted from GP electronic health record systems following completion of each consultation:
a Patient demographic data
b Consultation data
GPs will be encouraged to enter the data into the coded fields (e.g. reason for visit, medications) in their practice clinical systems as only these data will be sent to Healthelink. Free text information entered into the clinical notes for example will not be sent to Healthelink. The coded field only approach means that GPs can be confident that a sensitive free text comment entered into the clinical notes will not be sent to Healthelink and will not be available for other providers or the patient to view.”
With this background a few comments and discoveries made while researching the progress of the project are worth sharing.
First, the exclusion of the text notes and the expectation of using the coded information in the diagnostic fields is quite problematic. Experience from HealthConnect trials in the NT showed coded data was often not provided and this often led to the situation where it was impossible to understand just what a particular encounter was about. Healthelink looks likely to have similar data-quality issues.
Second, a review of the patient searching capabilities provided to users of the system confirm the worst fears of those concerned with privacy protection. A search on a partial name and approximate age (+/- 5 years) generates a weighted (for match) listing which contains a pretty full demographic record with full name, address etc. Just the sort of thing abused wives etc want to keep to themselves! The system should insist on a much higher level of initial knowledge – not that even this would help in the case of an abusive spouse.
Third, the system has no apparent concept of location etc – so if you are on the data-base and have not opted out you are findable. Extension of such a system state wide is clearly very problematic.
The record displayed by the system once the patient is located is also not segmented into more or less confidential information which means the patient has to make a choice to opt totally in or out on the basis of the most sensitive piece of information in the record as far as they are concerned.
All these issues are in addition to the lack of initial consent to having information stored as would be the case had ‘opt in’ been selected. For reasons best known to itself the NSW Department has decided to ignore not only its own earlier reports on the matter but also its own explicit Health Privacy Principle.
“HPP15 Linkage of Health Records
“Personal health information must not be included in a system that links health records in one service with health records in another health service unless the individual it relates to has expressly consented”.
A specific regulatory exemption from HPP15 has been provided for the Healthelink pilot. Whether this exemption should be retained after the end of the pilot will form part of the pilot evaluation.
The regulation provides for the use of an “opt out” consent model. This ensures health consumers will continue to be able to exercise the choice as to whether or not they participate in Healthelink and to exercise this choice at any time.”
I am aware that at least some physicians are by no means convinced this NSW regulation does not violate the Commonwealth Privacy Act.
Leaving the whole privacy issue aside there are a few other points to be made and question to be asked.
1. Just why has all this taken so long?
Taken from the March 2006 Project Outline:
"In March 2000, the NSW Health Council set an objective for the NSW health system to implement the Electronic Health Record (to be known as Healthelink) by 2010. Health Ministers also endorsed the proposal for a National Health Information Network, known as HealthConnect. The NSW Healthelink pilots were endorsed as one of the trials for the National HealthConnect program.
In May 2004 the Health Minister announced that the Care Junction Consortium consisting of LogicaCMG, Orion International and Healthlink had been selected to work with NSW Health to implement NSW electronic health record pilots – expected to commence operation in the first quarter of 2006.”
We now know what was then EHR*NET was the original proposal and the rename came a good deal later. We also must wonder why the whole thing should take six years from concept to pilot. At this pace 2010 does not look all that good for a total state roll out. (Note the 2002 implementation plan of EHR*NET indicated the project would be complete by June 2007 – time to really pick up pace!)
2. In a very recent (25/09/2006) GP information document we find the following:
“How would the Practice apply for the GP Testing Grant?
The Healthelink system is complex and although the components of the system will be thoroughly tested centrally, assistance will be required with testing the system once installed at practices and as used by GPs. Healthelink is therefore requesting that practices offer to assist the testing process and become early adopters.
A grant of $10,000 will be available to these practices subject to signing up to participate, meeting the eligibility criteria and being in a position to install the Healthelink software by 30 November 2006 or a date otherwise agreed with Healthelink. More details are available in the GP Testing Grant Agreement. “
I wonder how the announcement of this largesse was missed by the press and when the decision was made to be so generous!?
It seems to me this is a sign of desperation on the part of the project to have practitioners concerned about liability and indemnity to get moving.
3. It seems to me there will some real issues involved in the scalability of this system in a technical and user sense. Having a search operate across million people data-bases may turn out to be a real challenge.
4. There is also a real issue about just what impact the system as presently conceived will have on practice work flow and what value the practitioner will receive. The lack of proper integration between Healthelink and the practice management system may prove to be very difficult to use in practice - switching between one system and another. To have the system used properly it needs to be quick to access and consistently provide useful and relatively complete information.
5. The project's approach of making records unavailable for 30 days clearly makes very little sense and needs to be reviewed in the context of an overall privacy approach review.
I am afraid this project has all the signs of a project that is on the ropes. I hope not since it has taken so long to get this far. In many ways I am not surprised. As those who have read this blog for a while will know I have always been convinced that the complexities and difficulties associated with shared summary electronic health records have been very underestimated.
Maybe a strategic re-think and revision of the privacy approach can grab victory from the jaws of defeat. I hope so.
David.
The concept of the trial is as follows:
Healthcare providers (hospitals, GPs, diagnostic providers and community services etc) in two specific areas treating two specific categories of patients (the 65 + in the Hunter and the young children in Westmead) have an encounter record created each time they attend a participating facility.
The idea is that over time a longitudinal health record on each individual will be built up.’
On each encounter both demographic and clinical information will be captured.
The encounter from the GP, for example, will capture the following information automatically at the end of a consultation. Quoting directly from an Healthelink information sheet.
“The following fields will be extracted from GP electronic health record systems following completion of each consultation:
a Patient demographic data
- Surname, Given Names
- Date of Birth
- Medicare Number
- Gender/Sex
- Contact details (e.g. address, phone numbers)
b Consultation data
- Provider/clinician – name, role and location
- Diagnosis/reason for visit
- Allergies
- Pathology/radiology test results (when a GP associates a report with a patient record)
- Medications - Prescription Order Information (Script number, GP name and ID), Prescribed Medication (Name, Route and Instructions) and Medication Administration Information
GPs will be encouraged to enter the data into the coded fields (e.g. reason for visit, medications) in their practice clinical systems as only these data will be sent to Healthelink. Free text information entered into the clinical notes for example will not be sent to Healthelink. The coded field only approach means that GPs can be confident that a sensitive free text comment entered into the clinical notes will not be sent to Healthelink and will not be available for other providers or the patient to view.”
With this background a few comments and discoveries made while researching the progress of the project are worth sharing.
First, the exclusion of the text notes and the expectation of using the coded information in the diagnostic fields is quite problematic. Experience from HealthConnect trials in the NT showed coded data was often not provided and this often led to the situation where it was impossible to understand just what a particular encounter was about. Healthelink looks likely to have similar data-quality issues.
Second, a review of the patient searching capabilities provided to users of the system confirm the worst fears of those concerned with privacy protection. A search on a partial name and approximate age (+/- 5 years) generates a weighted (for match) listing which contains a pretty full demographic record with full name, address etc. Just the sort of thing abused wives etc want to keep to themselves! The system should insist on a much higher level of initial knowledge – not that even this would help in the case of an abusive spouse.
Third, the system has no apparent concept of location etc – so if you are on the data-base and have not opted out you are findable. Extension of such a system state wide is clearly very problematic.
The record displayed by the system once the patient is located is also not segmented into more or less confidential information which means the patient has to make a choice to opt totally in or out on the basis of the most sensitive piece of information in the record as far as they are concerned.
All these issues are in addition to the lack of initial consent to having information stored as would be the case had ‘opt in’ been selected. For reasons best known to itself the NSW Department has decided to ignore not only its own earlier reports on the matter but also its own explicit Health Privacy Principle.
“HPP15 Linkage of Health Records
“Personal health information must not be included in a system that links health records in one service with health records in another health service unless the individual it relates to has expressly consented”.
A specific regulatory exemption from HPP15 has been provided for the Healthelink pilot. Whether this exemption should be retained after the end of the pilot will form part of the pilot evaluation.
The regulation provides for the use of an “opt out” consent model. This ensures health consumers will continue to be able to exercise the choice as to whether or not they participate in Healthelink and to exercise this choice at any time.”
I am aware that at least some physicians are by no means convinced this NSW regulation does not violate the Commonwealth Privacy Act.
Leaving the whole privacy issue aside there are a few other points to be made and question to be asked.
1. Just why has all this taken so long?
Taken from the March 2006 Project Outline:
"In March 2000, the NSW Health Council set an objective for the NSW health system to implement the Electronic Health Record (to be known as Healthelink) by 2010. Health Ministers also endorsed the proposal for a National Health Information Network, known as HealthConnect. The NSW Healthelink pilots were endorsed as one of the trials for the National HealthConnect program.
In May 2004 the Health Minister announced that the Care Junction Consortium consisting of LogicaCMG, Orion International and Healthlink had been selected to work with NSW Health to implement NSW electronic health record pilots – expected to commence operation in the first quarter of 2006.”
We now know what was then EHR*NET was the original proposal and the rename came a good deal later. We also must wonder why the whole thing should take six years from concept to pilot. At this pace 2010 does not look all that good for a total state roll out. (Note the 2002 implementation plan of EHR*NET indicated the project would be complete by June 2007 – time to really pick up pace!)
2. In a very recent (25/09/2006) GP information document we find the following:
“How would the Practice apply for the GP Testing Grant?
The Healthelink system is complex and although the components of the system will be thoroughly tested centrally, assistance will be required with testing the system once installed at practices and as used by GPs. Healthelink is therefore requesting that practices offer to assist the testing process and become early adopters.
A grant of $10,000 will be available to these practices subject to signing up to participate, meeting the eligibility criteria and being in a position to install the Healthelink software by 30 November 2006 or a date otherwise agreed with Healthelink. More details are available in the GP Testing Grant Agreement. “
I wonder how the announcement of this largesse was missed by the press and when the decision was made to be so generous!?
It seems to me this is a sign of desperation on the part of the project to have practitioners concerned about liability and indemnity to get moving.
3. It seems to me there will some real issues involved in the scalability of this system in a technical and user sense. Having a search operate across million people data-bases may turn out to be a real challenge.
4. There is also a real issue about just what impact the system as presently conceived will have on practice work flow and what value the practitioner will receive. The lack of proper integration between Healthelink and the practice management system may prove to be very difficult to use in practice - switching between one system and another. To have the system used properly it needs to be quick to access and consistently provide useful and relatively complete information.
5. The project's approach of making records unavailable for 30 days clearly makes very little sense and needs to be reviewed in the context of an overall privacy approach review.
I am afraid this project has all the signs of a project that is on the ropes. I hope not since it has taken so long to get this far. In many ways I am not surprised. As those who have read this blog for a while will know I have always been convinced that the complexities and difficulties associated with shared summary electronic health records have been very underestimated.
Maybe a strategic re-think and revision of the privacy approach can grab victory from the jaws of defeat. I hope so.
David.
Friday, November 24, 2006
The AusHealthIT Manifesto – What is the Blog On About?
Since starting the blog in March I have written getting on for a hundred posts and have seen interest in the blog and comments slowly increase over that time. It has seemed to me that, with the research and thinking that has required, I now need to crystallise what I am trying to say and make sure I am achieving clarity in the objectives I have for all this. In doing this I want that the reader be under no illusion as to my background, perspectives and views.
As to background, its pretty simple. I am (was) a specialist in anaesthesia, intensive care and emergency medicine who has been working one way or another for the last 23 years to improve the use of information technology in the health sector.
As to perspective I am operating from the following assumptions which I am convinced are true.
First, Health IT is a potential major enabler of quality and safety in the delivery of health services, but is not the whole answer to safer, higher quality health service.
Second, the possible added value in increased deployment of advanced Health IT throughout the Health Sector is very large and delay is resulting in a very large opportunity costs in terms of both lives and dollars.
Third, while health service delivery is an information intensive activity which is able to be successfully assisted with Health IT, failure to involve and work with all types of health professionals and other stakeholder in the planning for and implementation of new Health IT is a catastrophic mistake.
Fourth, the deployment and use of Information Technology in the health sector in Australia is presently largely inadequate, underspent and ineffective.
Fifth it is clear that personal identified health information is seen by the public as something they want to have control over and any plans or implementation approaches that do not recognise this fact are for all practical purposes ultimately doomed.
Sixth, and somewhat paradoxically, what is needed is a carefully developed consensus based National E-Health Plan, Business Case and Implementation Plan which is then delivered in local contexts which respond to local needs but which conform to a national overall Framework (this is especially important regarding the selection and implementation of systems).
Seventh, there is pretty common agreement that most Government initiatives at both Federal and State level have not delivered as well as might be hoped. Most would also agree that at present there is little in the way of Federal Government leadership or direction being provided for the E-Health sector.
Eighth, there is a very large skills gap at both user and Health IT levels which needs to be addressed nationally with some urgency.
Ninth the lack of openness and transparency regarding both HealthConnect and other major Health IT project outcomes and failures has limited the learning that has been possible from the mistakes made so far. NEHTA appears to be replicating this mistake at the time of writing (November 2006). It is vital all lessons are learned – especially from the projects that have not worked out as desired
Tenth, it is important to recognise that commercial providers of Health IT have expertise and skills which should be exploited but equally health organisations need to bring comprehensive project management and change management skills as well as business understanding to any Health IT implementation.
Eleventh, in the words of the late Milton Friedman as far as Health IT is concerned there is “no such thing as a free lunch” (i.e. you have to pay for value received).
Twelfth, it is clear, largely because of the way benefits from Health IT are not recouped by the users of the technology, that there be mechanisms to have those return the benefits they receive to those who do the work.
Thirteenth, it seems highly likely that the major payoff from Health IT is to be found only in very advanced systems which improve clinical decision making and minimise errors both of omission and commission.
Last, there are proven and deployable Health IT solutions which can be successfully deployed today with the right project and change management. It is important to get on with it.
My view is that right now there is a lot of unfocussed, uncoordinated activity going on (some good and some bad) and that it is the time to take a step back, work out, at a national level, what is needed and how best to get there. As a nation in 2000/1 we had some good ideas with HealthConnect but we then lost the plot and momentum by early 2005. We can’t afford another wasted four years.
In the blog I hope to alert and warn where I see mistakes being made and lessons we should already have learnt being repeated. Hopefully the assumptions above will point to those things which need to be assured before investments are made.
Overall I am hoping to foster the change from a heard of cats to a sleek shoal of fish all swimming towards real, practical and achievable goals.
David.
As to background, its pretty simple. I am (was) a specialist in anaesthesia, intensive care and emergency medicine who has been working one way or another for the last 23 years to improve the use of information technology in the health sector.
As to perspective I am operating from the following assumptions which I am convinced are true.
First, Health IT is a potential major enabler of quality and safety in the delivery of health services, but is not the whole answer to safer, higher quality health service.
Second, the possible added value in increased deployment of advanced Health IT throughout the Health Sector is very large and delay is resulting in a very large opportunity costs in terms of both lives and dollars.
Third, while health service delivery is an information intensive activity which is able to be successfully assisted with Health IT, failure to involve and work with all types of health professionals and other stakeholder in the planning for and implementation of new Health IT is a catastrophic mistake.
Fourth, the deployment and use of Information Technology in the health sector in Australia is presently largely inadequate, underspent and ineffective.
Fifth it is clear that personal identified health information is seen by the public as something they want to have control over and any plans or implementation approaches that do not recognise this fact are for all practical purposes ultimately doomed.
Sixth, and somewhat paradoxically, what is needed is a carefully developed consensus based National E-Health Plan, Business Case and Implementation Plan which is then delivered in local contexts which respond to local needs but which conform to a national overall Framework (this is especially important regarding the selection and implementation of systems).
Seventh, there is pretty common agreement that most Government initiatives at both Federal and State level have not delivered as well as might be hoped. Most would also agree that at present there is little in the way of Federal Government leadership or direction being provided for the E-Health sector.
Eighth, there is a very large skills gap at both user and Health IT levels which needs to be addressed nationally with some urgency.
Ninth the lack of openness and transparency regarding both HealthConnect and other major Health IT project outcomes and failures has limited the learning that has been possible from the mistakes made so far. NEHTA appears to be replicating this mistake at the time of writing (November 2006). It is vital all lessons are learned – especially from the projects that have not worked out as desired
Tenth, it is important to recognise that commercial providers of Health IT have expertise and skills which should be exploited but equally health organisations need to bring comprehensive project management and change management skills as well as business understanding to any Health IT implementation.
Eleventh, in the words of the late Milton Friedman as far as Health IT is concerned there is “no such thing as a free lunch” (i.e. you have to pay for value received).
Twelfth, it is clear, largely because of the way benefits from Health IT are not recouped by the users of the technology, that there be mechanisms to have those return the benefits they receive to those who do the work.
Thirteenth, it seems highly likely that the major payoff from Health IT is to be found only in very advanced systems which improve clinical decision making and minimise errors both of omission and commission.
Last, there are proven and deployable Health IT solutions which can be successfully deployed today with the right project and change management. It is important to get on with it.
My view is that right now there is a lot of unfocussed, uncoordinated activity going on (some good and some bad) and that it is the time to take a step back, work out, at a national level, what is needed and how best to get there. As a nation in 2000/1 we had some good ideas with HealthConnect but we then lost the plot and momentum by early 2005. We can’t afford another wasted four years.
In the blog I hope to alert and warn where I see mistakes being made and lessons we should already have learnt being repeated. Hopefully the assumptions above will point to those things which need to be assured before investments are made.
Overall I am hoping to foster the change from a heard of cats to a sleek shoal of fish all swimming towards real, practical and achievable goals.
David.
Thursday, November 23, 2006
Correction to Comments on South Australian Oacis System Security.
It seems I have been misinformed regarding the level of security offered by the Oacis.
John Mleczko, Director Projects Branch ICT Services, Department of Health, South Australia has informed me of true security status today. I quote from his note.
“In response to statements made in your article "Personal Health Information Privacy - The Elephant in the Room" posted 28 Oct 2006 10:04PM CDT you ask for correction in regards to access to the Oacis system implemented in South Australia's major metropolitan public hospitals.
You suggest “a clinical user at one hospital, once logged on, could access any record of essentially any type for any South Australian”. The security model is facility based hence this is incorrect which means a user at a hospital can access the records of their patients at that hospital. You also suggest that access is “non-individualised and non role based”. Access to Oacis has always been individualised and role based.”
He then goes on to explain, in detail, the various steps taken to ensure the logged on users stay within the correct bounds – including warnings, audit trails etc.
This is good news.
In response I have asked the following questions by e-mail.
“Hi John,
Thanks for that...Just so I am clear this means that the access privileges for a medical registrar who is in charge of a hospital over night has his/her privileges changed according to the time of day (own service versus whole hospital) and that the intern in Emergency only sees results undertaken at that hospital - even if there are results at IMVS etc for the same patient done recently?
When I last chatted to people involved (a year or two back I admit) it was suggested to me that once you had medical or other high level access to the database it was essentially "open slather" - or is that only for those providing information into Oacis who clearly would seem to need to be able to access the whole results data base - for historical comparisons if for no other reason.
As you know audit trails and warnings have hardly been 100% effective at the Tax Office and CentreLink
If it has always been true that there were no group log-ons to Oacis I am happy about that!
I will happily place an edit noting your comments once I am clear.
On a related issue, given Oacis is a shared database just what control does the individual patient have about the recording of data on that database and who can see the data. This becomes an obvious issue as soon as any information is made available in a shared way. Does a patient admitted to an Oacis using facility have the choice of what is shared from say previous admissions (e.g. they may want to suppress a pathology report mentioning products of conception etc)?
Cheers
David.”
One of the Oacis brochures from 2004 has an intern saying how useful it is to be able to access information from previous admissions so clarity is important I believe.
I will keep everyone informed as information becomes available.
David.
John Mleczko, Director Projects Branch ICT Services, Department of Health, South Australia has informed me of true security status today. I quote from his note.
“In response to statements made in your article "Personal Health Information Privacy - The Elephant in the Room" posted 28 Oct 2006 10:04PM CDT you ask for correction in regards to access to the Oacis system implemented in South Australia's major metropolitan public hospitals.
You suggest “a clinical user at one hospital, once logged on, could access any record of essentially any type for any South Australian”. The security model is facility based hence this is incorrect which means a user at a hospital can access the records of their patients at that hospital. You also suggest that access is “non-individualised and non role based”. Access to Oacis has always been individualised and role based.”
He then goes on to explain, in detail, the various steps taken to ensure the logged on users stay within the correct bounds – including warnings, audit trails etc.
This is good news.
In response I have asked the following questions by e-mail.
“Hi John,
Thanks for that...Just so I am clear this means that the access privileges for a medical registrar who is in charge of a hospital over night has his/her privileges changed according to the time of day (own service versus whole hospital) and that the intern in Emergency only sees results undertaken at that hospital - even if there are results at IMVS etc for the same patient done recently?
When I last chatted to people involved (a year or two back I admit) it was suggested to me that once you had medical or other high level access to the database it was essentially "open slather" - or is that only for those providing information into Oacis who clearly would seem to need to be able to access the whole results data base - for historical comparisons if for no other reason.
As you know audit trails and warnings have hardly been 100% effective at the Tax Office and CentreLink
If it has always been true that there were no group log-ons to Oacis I am happy about that!
I will happily place an edit noting your comments once I am clear.
On a related issue, given Oacis is a shared database just what control does the individual patient have about the recording of data on that database and who can see the data. This becomes an obvious issue as soon as any information is made available in a shared way. Does a patient admitted to an Oacis using facility have the choice of what is shared from say previous admissions (e.g. they may want to suppress a pathology report mentioning products of conception etc)?
Cheers
David.”
One of the Oacis brochures from 2004 has an intern saying how useful it is to be able to access information from previous admissions so clarity is important I believe.
I will keep everyone informed as information becomes available.
David.
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
A Do Nothing E-Health Minister – Incapacity, Inactivity or Just Bad Advice from the Department?
Its getting to the time of the year when the Health bureaucrat starts to think of all things Christmas and congratulate themselves on a year well spent.
How is the report card looking this year I wonder?
In this context I guess it would be about time to remind Minister Abbott of what he said to the Sydney Morning Herald on September 6, 2005 and to use that as a benchmark.
See:
http://www.smh.com.au/news/next/erecords--a-healthy-chart-buster/2005/09/05/1125772438601.html
“Abbott's patience runs out
Federal Health Minister Tony Abbott admits to "a great deal of slippage" with the Federal Government's $128million national electronic medical records program but says he is working to ensure that patients get benefits within 12 months.
"I will do everything I can to meet these deadlines and I will be disappointed if we don't," he says.
His comments come after he told a breakfast briefing at Parliament House that he was "sick of trials and studies and working groups", and wanted to see electronic health records making a difference in patients' lives by the middle of next year.”
What do we see 14 month later?
A Department of Health and Ageing Report Card
Well it has been a year of focused but quite secret activity. The E-health Program from DoHA seems to be divided into five areas:
1. E-Health Business Development.
The emphasis here is on Managed Health Network Grants for development of health networking. They were announced December 2005 and the funds must be spent by June 30, 2007. Sadly no winners have yet been announced so the spend fest is likely to be amazing.
The earlier Eastern Goldfields Regional Reference Site, where amazingly expensive broadband access was provided to practitioners. The viability of the network is now questionable without the government subsidy
2. E-Health communications
This provides access to the HealthConnect Archive which has been pretty stable since February 2006. The June 2006 E-Health Newsletter has been reviewed earlier.
3. E-Health Governance
Progress here has been that the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has announced that:
“From February 2006, governments will accelerate work on a national electronic health records system to improve safety for patients and increase efficiency for health care providers by developing the capacity for health providers, with their patient’s consent, to communicate safely and securely with each other electronically about patients and their health. This requires:
• developing, implementing and operating systems for an individual health identifier, a healthcare provider identifier and agreed clinical terminologies; and
• promoting compliance with nationally-agreed standards in future government procurement related to electronic health systems and in areas of healthcare receiving government funding.”
The strength of this commitment was emphasised by the disappearance of the Australian Health Information Council which is meant to be the peak advisory body to COAG on such matters. Clearly E-Health governance isn’t actually happening as best one can tell.
4. E-Health Major Programs
There are four major programs:
1. Broadband for Health.
Giving practitioners broadband internet access – clearly practitioners can’t find the $40 per month to pay for it them selves (tax deductible business expense of actually less).
2. HealthConnect
Said to be as follows:
“HealthConnect is an overarching national change management strategy to improve safety and quality in healthcare by establishing and maintaining a range of standardised electronic health information products and services for healthcare providers and consumers.”
Not much change seems to be happening federally (I will review the State HealthConnect initiatives in a separate post) and no one knows, or at least I don’t, what the “standardised electronic health information products and services for healthcare providers and consumers” are.
As most know, the E-Health Implementation Branch (previously responsible for all this including HealthConnect) has been wound down, after Dr Brian Richards and then Tam Shepherd left. Now it is being led Lisa McGlynn (who is ex NSW Health – but not an expert e-health or technology I am told).
I am also told all the original staff (with any corporate knowledge of e-health which they may have built up) have moved on, and the incoming staff are all people who have never worked in health and know nothing about e-health or IT. Apparently the States and Territories can’t get any sense out of them at all now. Many commentators have suggested to me they think that this tactic is deliberate to wind down the branch to nothing.
3. HealthInsite.
An excellent idea and well implemented. By far the best initiative of DoHA. Pity they have not had a few more good ideas since this service began in mid 2002.
4. NEHTA.
It is very hard to comment on NEHTA since it is a privatisation of Government accountability to ensure that if it does not work the Minister can't be blamed and that the truth will never be known as Freedom Of Information does not apply.
Sadly NEHTA is not an outsourced e-Health Government strategy - or the Government would have had an outsourcing contract with all the usual performance hurdles and rewards.
The NEHTA Directors must be hoping some concrete results will be delivered soon since the organisation now has over sixty staff and, as yet, it is hard to see that much has been delivered other the FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) on the part of all the other actors in the E-Health space.
My view is that unless there are some really useful and practical outcomes within the next six months (i.e. having been in action for just on three years (Authorised by COAG July 2004)serious questions will start being asked. The opportunity cost of all this inactivity is really astronomical in terms of patient suffering and lives lost.
5. E-Health Strategic Policy.
This section comes direct from the DoHA web site
“Information regarding e-Health strategic policy and how it is being implemented is found in this area of the website.
Strategic policy alignment takes a strong focus on the monitoring and analysis of trends and technology, in order to drive the Australian Governments' e-Health agenda. The work involves the provision of advice on Departmental, other government and independent e-Health related activity and the establishment of appropriate regulatory frameworks to enable e-Health nationally. Much of this work is linked with the National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) work program. Further information about NEHTA and the work program can be found at the following site: www.nehta.gov.au
Page last modified: 21 April, 2006”
Sadly there is not a word about policy other than it has been passed to NEHTA, and can be understood as a work-program!
What does this all amount to?
I would contend it amounts to a virtually total abdication of central government involvement in E-Health. We have seen no significant concrete progress and the National E-Health Strategy, Business Case and Implementation Plans remain non-existent and the relevant Federal bureaucracy seems to have essentially imploded.
I hope next November I can write a happier report. I suspect our Health Minister must be very disappointed and frustrated in the progress made in the last twelve months!
David.
How is the report card looking this year I wonder?
In this context I guess it would be about time to remind Minister Abbott of what he said to the Sydney Morning Herald on September 6, 2005 and to use that as a benchmark.
See:
http://www.smh.com.au/news/next/erecords--a-healthy-chart-buster/2005/09/05/1125772438601.html
“Abbott's patience runs out
Federal Health Minister Tony Abbott admits to "a great deal of slippage" with the Federal Government's $128million national electronic medical records program but says he is working to ensure that patients get benefits within 12 months.
"I will do everything I can to meet these deadlines and I will be disappointed if we don't," he says.
His comments come after he told a breakfast briefing at Parliament House that he was "sick of trials and studies and working groups", and wanted to see electronic health records making a difference in patients' lives by the middle of next year.”
What do we see 14 month later?
A Department of Health and Ageing Report Card
Well it has been a year of focused but quite secret activity. The E-health Program from DoHA seems to be divided into five areas:
1. E-Health Business Development.
The emphasis here is on Managed Health Network Grants for development of health networking. They were announced December 2005 and the funds must be spent by June 30, 2007. Sadly no winners have yet been announced so the spend fest is likely to be amazing.
The earlier Eastern Goldfields Regional Reference Site, where amazingly expensive broadband access was provided to practitioners. The viability of the network is now questionable without the government subsidy
2. E-Health communications
This provides access to the HealthConnect Archive which has been pretty stable since February 2006. The June 2006 E-Health Newsletter has been reviewed earlier.
3. E-Health Governance
Progress here has been that the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has announced that:
“From February 2006, governments will accelerate work on a national electronic health records system to improve safety for patients and increase efficiency for health care providers by developing the capacity for health providers, with their patient’s consent, to communicate safely and securely with each other electronically about patients and their health. This requires:
• developing, implementing and operating systems for an individual health identifier, a healthcare provider identifier and agreed clinical terminologies; and
• promoting compliance with nationally-agreed standards in future government procurement related to electronic health systems and in areas of healthcare receiving government funding.”
The strength of this commitment was emphasised by the disappearance of the Australian Health Information Council which is meant to be the peak advisory body to COAG on such matters. Clearly E-Health governance isn’t actually happening as best one can tell.
4. E-Health Major Programs
There are four major programs:
1. Broadband for Health.
Giving practitioners broadband internet access – clearly practitioners can’t find the $40 per month to pay for it them selves (tax deductible business expense of actually less).
2. HealthConnect
Said to be as follows:
“HealthConnect is an overarching national change management strategy to improve safety and quality in healthcare by establishing and maintaining a range of standardised electronic health information products and services for healthcare providers and consumers.”
Not much change seems to be happening federally (I will review the State HealthConnect initiatives in a separate post) and no one knows, or at least I don’t, what the “standardised electronic health information products and services for healthcare providers and consumers” are.
As most know, the E-Health Implementation Branch (previously responsible for all this including HealthConnect) has been wound down, after Dr Brian Richards and then Tam Shepherd left. Now it is being led Lisa McGlynn (who is ex NSW Health – but not an expert e-health or technology I am told).
I am also told all the original staff (with any corporate knowledge of e-health which they may have built up) have moved on, and the incoming staff are all people who have never worked in health and know nothing about e-health or IT. Apparently the States and Territories can’t get any sense out of them at all now. Many commentators have suggested to me they think that this tactic is deliberate to wind down the branch to nothing.
3. HealthInsite.
An excellent idea and well implemented. By far the best initiative of DoHA. Pity they have not had a few more good ideas since this service began in mid 2002.
4. NEHTA.
It is very hard to comment on NEHTA since it is a privatisation of Government accountability to ensure that if it does not work the Minister can't be blamed and that the truth will never be known as Freedom Of Information does not apply.
Sadly NEHTA is not an outsourced e-Health Government strategy - or the Government would have had an outsourcing contract with all the usual performance hurdles and rewards.
The NEHTA Directors must be hoping some concrete results will be delivered soon since the organisation now has over sixty staff and, as yet, it is hard to see that much has been delivered other the FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) on the part of all the other actors in the E-Health space.
My view is that unless there are some really useful and practical outcomes within the next six months (i.e. having been in action for just on three years (Authorised by COAG July 2004)serious questions will start being asked. The opportunity cost of all this inactivity is really astronomical in terms of patient suffering and lives lost.
5. E-Health Strategic Policy.
This section comes direct from the DoHA web site
“Information regarding e-Health strategic policy and how it is being implemented is found in this area of the website.
Strategic policy alignment takes a strong focus on the monitoring and analysis of trends and technology, in order to drive the Australian Governments' e-Health agenda. The work involves the provision of advice on Departmental, other government and independent e-Health related activity and the establishment of appropriate regulatory frameworks to enable e-Health nationally. Much of this work is linked with the National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) work program. Further information about NEHTA and the work program can be found at the following site: www.nehta.gov.au
Page last modified: 21 April, 2006”
Sadly there is not a word about policy other than it has been passed to NEHTA, and can be understood as a work-program!
What does this all amount to?
I would contend it amounts to a virtually total abdication of central government involvement in E-Health. We have seen no significant concrete progress and the National E-Health Strategy, Business Case and Implementation Plans remain non-existent and the relevant Federal bureaucracy seems to have essentially imploded.
I hope next November I can write a happier report. I suspect our Health Minister must be very disappointed and frustrated in the progress made in the last twelve months!
David.
Sunday, November 19, 2006
The Drug Pricing Scandal and How the Sick are Ripped off in Australia.
First, apologies to the die hard Health IT readers. For once I am going to stray from the chosen Health IT path, due to a deep sense of gob smacked outrage.
In the last week or so we have had the Federal Health Minister – Mr Tony Abbott – claiming he has just done a wonderful job negotiating a great reduction of the cost of generic prescription medicines and how grateful we all should be.
Without putting too fine a point on it that was just total codswallop.
A day or so the Wall Street Journal made available the pricing for Generic Prescription Medicine from Wal-Mart – the US retail chain. I grabbed the seven page price list document to see just what was on offer.
Essentially what is available is one months supply of a very large range of life saving medicines in a wide range of therapeutic classes for $US4.00 – i.e. $A5.30 per month.
Included in the list are Anti-Allergy, Anti-Inflammatory, Anti-Anxiety, Anti- Depressant Anti-Psychotic and so on medicines. Also included are a wide range of antibiotics (including Penicillin, Amoxycillin, Bactrim, Cephalosporins and even Ciprofloxin), 2 statins drugs, some hormones (e.g. Thyroid Replacement Therapy and Prednisone) and even multi-vitamins and Prozac.
The only major class of drug I could not find were the proton pump inhibitors for which the H2 Receptor Antagonists are nearly as good and just as safe. The PPIs will be off patent very soon I am sure (They are in Australia I believe) or it might be they are a bit more costly to manufacture.
The stand out saving for me was that Meloxicam – an anti-inflammatory for osteo-arthritis that I take was available for $5.30 a month rather than the $29.50 I presently pay! Without going into details my monthly $100 prescription costs could be adjusted down to about $20 a month with little or no change in the quality or safety of my treatment.
This really is a huge con with the drug companies and the pharmacists getting rich off the back of those unlucky enough to need prescription medicine. With this fix in a huge number of people are being ripped off and many, I am sure, are missing out on effective medicines that could make a great difference to the quality and quantity of their lives due to costs they may not be able to afford.
Our much vaunted Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme looks to like a wonderful cosy drug company – pharmacist – government cartel to me. Transparent it certainly is not and how – with these sort of savings possible – one can justify keeping the supermarkets out of the area is beyond belief.
We will now return to our usual program with that off my chest.
David.
Note – Please e-mail me if you want a copy of the list – its only about 50Kbyte so easy to e-mail.
In the last week or so we have had the Federal Health Minister – Mr Tony Abbott – claiming he has just done a wonderful job negotiating a great reduction of the cost of generic prescription medicines and how grateful we all should be.
Without putting too fine a point on it that was just total codswallop.
A day or so the Wall Street Journal made available the pricing for Generic Prescription Medicine from Wal-Mart – the US retail chain. I grabbed the seven page price list document to see just what was on offer.
Essentially what is available is one months supply of a very large range of life saving medicines in a wide range of therapeutic classes for $US4.00 – i.e. $A5.30 per month.
Included in the list are Anti-Allergy, Anti-Inflammatory, Anti-Anxiety, Anti- Depressant Anti-Psychotic and so on medicines. Also included are a wide range of antibiotics (including Penicillin, Amoxycillin, Bactrim, Cephalosporins and even Ciprofloxin), 2 statins drugs, some hormones (e.g. Thyroid Replacement Therapy and Prednisone) and even multi-vitamins and Prozac.
The only major class of drug I could not find were the proton pump inhibitors for which the H2 Receptor Antagonists are nearly as good and just as safe. The PPIs will be off patent very soon I am sure (They are in Australia I believe) or it might be they are a bit more costly to manufacture.
The stand out saving for me was that Meloxicam – an anti-inflammatory for osteo-arthritis that I take was available for $5.30 a month rather than the $29.50 I presently pay! Without going into details my monthly $100 prescription costs could be adjusted down to about $20 a month with little or no change in the quality or safety of my treatment.
This really is a huge con with the drug companies and the pharmacists getting rich off the back of those unlucky enough to need prescription medicine. With this fix in a huge number of people are being ripped off and many, I am sure, are missing out on effective medicines that could make a great difference to the quality and quantity of their lives due to costs they may not be able to afford.
Our much vaunted Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme looks to like a wonderful cosy drug company – pharmacist – government cartel to me. Transparent it certainly is not and how – with these sort of savings possible – one can justify keeping the supermarkets out of the area is beyond belief.
We will now return to our usual program with that off my chest.
David.
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