- September 17, 2012, 7:25 p.m. ET
Friday, September 28, 2012
This Is A Must Not Miss Contribution To The Discussion Of The Value of Health IT.
The following appeared a little while ago:
In Tuesday’s Wall Street Journal Op-Ed pages, physicians from Harvard and University Pennsylvania Medical Schools criticize subsidies for expanding the use of health information technology (HIT). The physicians cite a recent review article that failed to find consistent evidence of cost savings associated with HIT adoption. If true, this is bad news for the health economy, as supporters claim that HIT could cut health spending by as much as $1 trillion over the next decade.
How can something that is so avidly supported by most health policy analysts have such a poor track record in practice? In a new NBER working paper by myself, Avi Goldfarb, Chris Forman, and Shane Greenstein, we label this the “Trillion Dollar Conundrum.” One explanation may be that most HIT studies examine basic technologies such as clinical data repositories, while most of the buzz about HIT focuses on advanced technologies such as Computerized Physician Order Entry. In our paper, we offer a rather different explanation for the conundrum, one that would have eluded physicians and other health services researchers who failed to consider the management side of HIT.
My coauthors on this paper are experts on business information technology. They are not health services researchers. When I approached them to work on this topic, they insisted on viewing HIT much as one would view any business process innovation. As I have learned, this is by far the best way to study most any issue in healthcare management. Those who advocate that “healthcare is unique” – usually by ignoring broadly applicable theories and methodologies—often strain to explain data that are easily understood using more general frameworks. Such is the case with HIT.
Health services researchers have analyzed HIT much as they would analyze a new medical intervention. Some patients receive the treatment, others receive a placebo, and the treatment is deemed “successful” if the treatment group fares better than the control group and the difference passes statistical muster. While this methodology inspires a certain level of confidence in medicine, it has a critical shortcoming that has only recently been addressed through “personalized medicine.” The intervention might be effective for only some of the treatment group, and might be harmful to others. The typical research design masks these heterogeneous effects.
Lots more (and some really great comments) are found here:
Re the Author:
David Dranove, PhD, is the Walter McNerney Distinguished Professor of Health Industry Management at Northwestern University’s Kellogg Graduate School of Management, where he is also Professor of Management and Strategy and Director of the Health Enterprise Management Program. He has published over 80 research articles and book chapters and written five books, including “The Economic Evolution of American Healthcare and Code Red.” This post first appeared at Code Red.
This all needs careful reading as we are seeing a range of perspectives on many aspects of the “value of Health IT” debate and balance and careful logical thought is vital!
Here is coverage from the Wall St Journal of the trigger article:
In two years, hundreds of thousands of American physicians and thousands of hospitals that fail to buy and install costly health-care information technologies—such as digital records for prescriptions and patient histories—will face penalties through reduced Medicare and Medicaid payments. At the same time, the government expects to pay out tens of billions of dollars in subsidies and incentives to providers who install these technology programs.
The mandate, part of the 2009 stimulus legislation, was a major goal of health-care information technology lobbyists and their allies in Congress and the White House. The lobbyists promised that these technologies would make medical administration more efficient and lower medical costs by up to $100 billion annually. Many doctors and health-care administrators are wary of such claims—a wariness based on their own experience. An extensive new study indicates that the caution is justified: The savings turn out to be chimerical.
Since 2009, almost a third of health providers, a group that ranges from small private practices to huge hospitals—have installed at least some "health IT" technology. It wasn't cheap. For a major hospital, a full suite of technology products can cost $150 million to $200 million. Implementation—linking and integrating systems, training, data entry and the like—can raise the total bill to $1 billion.
But the software—sold by hundreds of health IT firms—is generally clunky, frustrating, user-unfriendly and inefficient. For instance, a doctor looking for a patient's current medications might have to click and scroll through many different screens to find that essential information. Depending on where and when information on a patient's prescriptions were entered, the complete list of medications may only be found across five different screens.
Now, a comprehensive evaluation of the scientific literature has confirmed what many researchers suspected: The savings claimed by government agencies and vendors of health IT are little more than hype.
Lots more here:
As I said - a contested space. Careful reading is vital!David.
Posted by Dr David More MB PhD FACHI at Friday, September 28, 2012